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I. INTRODUCTION
Airline traffic in the United States has experienced phenome-
nal growth since industry deregulation in 1978.1 The fifty busi-
* Member of the American Institute of Certified Planners. The author would
like to thank Dr. Robert Ward, Professor of Geography and Planning, Eastern
Michigan University, for his help and guidance in the preparation of this
Comment.
I Significant increases in airline travel have caused an almost doubling of traf-
fic in U.S. airports since 1978. Lyn L. Creswell, Airport Policy in the United States;
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est U.S. commercial airports handled eighty percent of all
passenger boardings in 1986.2 Industry growth combined with
consolidation of airline traffic into hub airports creates an ur-
gency for land use planning around airports to insure maximum
efficiency of operations and noise compatibility with adjacent
uses.' The idea of concentrating U.S. airline flight traffic into a
few hub airports gained popularity with the heightened compet-
itive environment after deregulation. Concentrating airline op-
erations into hub airports increases efficiency, but significantly
burdens airport infrastructure.4
Airports have failed to construct infrastructure to service the
increased demand for air transportation. Most major airports
were built and designed in the 1930s and did not incorporate
plans for future growth or adequate buffer zones to insure com-
patibility with adjacent uses. 5 More importantly, from the stand-
point of future expansion, most communities had not enacted
zoning regulations which might have prevented residential and
commercial development from encroaching on airport bor-
ders.6 Airports in the United States have become "bulls eye"7
facilities with insufficient buffers between airports and adjacent
The Need for Accountability, Planning, and Leadership, 19 TRASP. L.J. 1, 6 (1990)
(citing DOT, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS (1989)).
2 Carole A. Shiftin, Officials Hope Capacity Crisis Will Spur Expansion of Airports,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 9, 1987, at 83.
3
[L]and use compatibility also provides an important means of
mitigating the effect of aircraft noise.. . for those airport environs
which are still relatively undeveloped. Although there are often ill
defined legal barriers to utilization of zoning to achieve land use
compatibility... airport zoning could be effective if it is part of an
overall comprehensive plan and if it does not attempt to accom-
plish too much.
James H. Lloyd, Airport Noise: An Inadequate Judicial Response, 4 CONN. L. REv. 634,
668 (1972).
4 Creswell, supra note 1, at 19.
5 Id. at 32.
6 Zoning was a relatively new regulatory tool for the control of land use by
local governments in 1930. The zoning classification system was upheld in the
landmark United States Supreme Court decision of Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The opinion supported zoning as a valid func-
tion of local government police power which set the stage for a nationwide
proliferation of zoning ordinances. See id. at 394-97. For a thorough discussion
of zoning and its relationship to airports, see 2 PATRICKJ. ROHAN, ZONING AND
LAND USE CONTROLS § 15.01 (1992).
7 A phrase used by Long Beach City Councilman Tom Clark in describing the
Long Beach Airport. Long Beach Airport, LA. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1989, § 2, at 6.
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incompatible land uses. This has proven to be a significant
problem for airports in the United States.'
Despite congestion, hubbing, and traffic growth, there has
been no significant expansion of U.S. airports during the past
thirty years.9 But that may be changing with "at least seven ma-
jor expansions (Pittsburgh, Baltimore, Savannah, Nashville,
Memphis, Portland, and Tampa) . . . currently in the works."10
Dallas/Ft. Worth International Airport (DFW) was one of the
last major airports to open in the U.S. despite years of haggling
over its location.11 Existing hub airports are operating at or
near capacity and efforts to expand have encountered difficult
opposition from neighbors.12
Environmental constraints have also proven to be a difficult
obstacle in the path of airports because environmental aware-
ness has grown along with the need for airport expansion. The
National Environmental Policy Act of 196913 (NEPA) requires
that an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) be included in
recommendations or reports on proposals for federal actions
8 For example in Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977), the passenger
survivors of a lear jet that crashed and burned shortly after take-off sued a Geor-
gia county. The suit arose when the crash was determined to have resulted from
the aircraft's ingestion of birds into its engines. The swarming birds were from
an adjacent landfill. DeKalb County owned and operated the airport and the
landfill. The plaintiffs sued on the theory that they were third-party beneficiaries
of grant contracts between the county and the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA). The county had agreed to restrict the use of land adjacent to or near the
airport to activities compatible with normal aircraft operations. The plaintiffs
contended that by operating the landfill directly adjacent to the airport, the
county had breached its grant contracts. Id. at 34. See also Pike v. Kentucky
Power Co., 876 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Ky. 1993) (the personal representative of a
pilot's estate brought a wrongful death action against Kentucky Power after an
airplane collided with utility lines that were over two hundred foot high).
9 Creswell, supra note 1, at 34.
10 Vince Papsidero, Airport Noise Regulations, PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE RE-
PORT No. 437, 1 (May 1992).
n1 DFW was the result of pressure by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and
the Federal Aviation Administration after the federal government refused to fund
airport expansion plans at Love Field (the main airport in Dallas at the time)
because of limited expansion potential and homeowner opposition to increased
noise levels. Airline pilots declared Love Field unsafe. Creswell, supra note 1, at
35.
12 PAUL S. DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW AND REGULATION §7.01, 7-4 (1992).
13 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
1996] 245
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 4
Some state statutes also require an EIS."5
While many hub airports are under significant pressures to
expand, most are surrounded by encroaching land uses that
hinder or prevent growth plans. The problem of incompatible
adjacent land uses has far reaching effects. The need for airport
expansion under these conditions is well recognized:
One of the foremost problems confronting aviation today is
the protection of airports from urban encroachment. A consid-
erable number of the major air terminals of recent years have
become practically worthless, since they are unable to expand in
order to meet the runway demands of our modern aircraft.
Many of our present airports were constructed especially to meet
the war emergency and little thought was given to their post-war
use and the type of airplanes they would be serving .... Few
airport planners . . . could [envision] today's jet liner, which is
... standard equipment for commercial carriers.' 6
In major metropolitan areas, too often the only solution to
airport expansion is to build a new airport away from the urban-
ized center. 17 When expansion is not feasible because of site
constraints, increased air traffic can be accommodated only by
smaller incremental improvements, technological advances in
air traffic control systems which allow more frequent flights, or
more efficient use of existing sites and facilities.'
The high cost of technological improvements coupled with
the limited benefits derived from incremental expansion makes
full utilization of existing sites and facilities the most economi-
cally practical solution to the capacity problem.19 Butjet opera-
tions and the severe encroachment of existing airports, by
incompatible land uses, increases the problem of aircraft noise
14 See, e.g., City of Irving v. FAA, 539 F. Supp. 17 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that
a permanent change in a departure route at DFW is a major federal action neces-
sitating an EIS).
15 See, e.g., Secretary of Envtl. Affairs v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 323 N.E.2d
329, 338 (Mass. 1975) (holding that an EIS was required under Massachusetts law
before an airport expansion project).
16 Nelson E. Shafer, Zoning-The Airport and the Land Surrounding It in the Jet
Age, 48 Ky. LJ. 273, 274 (1949).
17 JFK outside of New York City, Dulles Airport outside of Washington, D.C.,
and Detroit Metropolitan Airport are examples.
18 DEMPSEY, supra note 12, at 7-5.
19 Id.
246
PROTECTING LAND AROUND AIRPORTS
and its adverse impact on adjacent property limits the full utili-
zation of airport facilities.2
The most effective method by which to prevent airport expan-
sion problems from noise compatibility and encroaching land
uses is to keep border areas free from all development. But this
is no longer an economically or physically practical solution. 1
The elimination of border development would require the out-
right purchase of surrounding properties by the power of emi-
nent domain.22 Because of the problems associated with this
technique, better utilization of existing airport sites and innova-
tive techniques in comprehensive planning and zoning have
emerged as the preferable methods to preserve open space
around airports.23
The purpose of this Comment is to alert the reader to the
major issues related to the regulatory control of land around
airports and to the current status of airport planning in the
United States while also providing a framework for drafting le-
gally sustainable comprehensive plans and overlay zoning regu-
lations. Section II provides a brief review of the involvement of
the federal government both legally and practically in issues re-
lated to the development of land and regulation of property ad-
jacent to airports. Section III provides a guide to the
administrative and legal framework for communities to under-
take planning. The majority of Section III is devoted to discus-
sion and review of past and present "takings" jurisprudence,
20 See Shafer, supra note 16, at 275-76.
21 Growth and development near airports:
[H]ave placed a high premium on unimproved land and have
made it virtually impossible to retain large amounts of open space.
Unable to establish buffer zones around major airports, many com-
munities have adopted alternate measures to protect ... against
encroachments while still permitting neighboring landowners to
use and enjoy their property ....
ROHAN, supra note 6, at 15-5.
22 Unquestionably, this would be the most desirable method, but there are
large constraints to this approach. The amount of land that would have to be
purchased is substantial, particularly if attempts are made to acquire all residen-
tial property affected by noise. The other problem is that land near airports is
extremely valuable for development purposes. An airport typically finances con-
struction and operations through user fees, and it would be extremely difficult
for most airports to raise sufficient capital to carry out such a program. These
constraints would also be present in attempts to obtain aviation easements (ease-
ments for the right to fly over land and cause noise, vibrations, smoke, fumes,
glare, dust, etc.). Easements are expensive, but cost less than outright purchase.
Id.
23 Id. at 15-8.
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with particular emphasis on recent U.S. Supreme Court case law
and its effect in shaping and defining "regulatory takings." This
discussion includes recommendations for avoiding claims. Also
reviewed are the underpinnings of local government police
power and the authority to enact planning and zoning
regulations.
Section IV is intended to be a guide to the basics of compre-
hensive planning as it relates to airports. The Section recom-
mends using the ALI Model Land Development Code and
individual state law to develop plans. Section IV also provides a
brief evaluation of the recent case law related to comprehensive
planning.
Section V gives the reader an introduction into the concept of
overlay zoning and its successful use in regulating property
around airports for noise and land use impacts. Included is a
discussion of recent decisions pertaining to the validity of over-
lay zoning.
II. FEDERAL ROLE IN AIRPORT PLANNING
While federal policy makers recommended a greater role for
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in land use planning
in the 1960s, the agency did not play a significant role until
1979.24 Since 1979, substantial federal funds have enabled the
federal government to play a pivotal role in airport planning.
25
The FAA, however, has been handily criticized for "setting up a
good program on paper, but then not training and participating
with airports in the development of plans. ' 26 The lack of federal
standards and representation in local planning efforts adds to
the fragmented system of airport planning in the United States.
While most airports are owned by local governments, aviation
impacts are "almost universally felt across . . . jurisdictional
boundaries. "27 Locally owned and operated airports are typi-
24 Congress adopted the Airport Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979 (AS-
NAA) providing federal noise abatement grants for airports. 49 U.S.C. § 2103
(1988). Grants were available only if a noise abatement plan was developed in
consultation with local governments. Id.
25 The Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 and the Airport and Air-
way Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of 1987, codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 2103,
2104 (1988), require airport development funds be set aside for planning. The
1982 law required the Secretary of Transportation to develop a plan for public
use airports in the United States. See 49 U.S.C. § 2103(a).
26 Creswell, supra note 1, at 9.
27 Id. at 32.
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cally immersed in community and regional complexities and ri-
valries. The predictable result has been disagreements between
governmental entities, including outright efforts to block each
other's plans.2 The loser in these battles is usually the airport
and the general public. 9
While airport plans must be submitted to the FAA, the agency
does not have the authority to veto specific plans.30 But in a
practical sense, the FAA's large financial contributions to air-
ports gives the agency substantial leverage in making sure air-
port plans meet national objectives and requirements.
III. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR AIRPORT
PLANNING
A. PREEMPTION
A fundamental issue in airport planning is the potential con-
flict between federal regulations and state land use law when
states exercise their police power by imposing land use controls
in areas subject to federal regulations.3 " Federal regulation of
natural resources, economic activities, and public facilities has
raised substantial questions about the exercise of federal power
under the Commerce Clause3 2 in regulating local conditions.
For example, FAA flight regulations for aircraft often conflict
with local land use and zoning regulations designed to reduce
noise from aircraft takeoffs and landings.3 3 Professor Malone
notes that the U.S. Supreme Court, in City of Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal, Inc.,34 held that local land use regulations to con-
trol aircraft noise are preempted by FAA regulations. But Pro-
fessor Malone points out that Burbank created some confusion
because the Court, in dicta, distinguished between municipali-
ties as regulators exercising police powers and municipalities as
owners operating airports.3 5 Owners are allowed to impose re-
strictions and controls on land in their ownership, but local gov-
ernments who do not own airports cannot impose restrictions.
28 TroyJ. Cole, Comment, Zoning Control of Airport Expansion by Host Cities and
the Battle over Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 193, 196
(1993).
29 Creswell, supra note 1, at 31.
30 14 C.F.R. §§ 157.3-.7 (1995).
31 See Cole, supra note 28, at 230.
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
33 LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF LAND USE 11-24 (1991).
34 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
35 MALONE, supra note 33, at 11-24.
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Although Burbank is most often cited for federal noise pre-
emption, the case is more important for airport vicinity plan-
ning because of the dicta in footnote fourteen. 6 Buried in its
majority opinion, the Court in footnote fourteen cited a letter
from the Secretary of Transportation from the Senate Report to
the Noise Control Act.37 The footnote stated that "many air-
ports are owned by one municipality yet physically located in
another.... [A]uthority that a municipality may have as a land-
lord is not necessarily congruent with its police power. We do
not consider here what limits, if any, apply to a municipality as a
proprietor."38 Burbank affirmed the basic principle that local
governments are preempted from exercising police powers to
regulate navigable airspace, but they can enact regulations
which apply to the land surrounding airports for valid public
purposes.3 9
B. POLICE POWER AND "TAKINGS" JURISPRUDENCE
The Constitution gives states and local governments broad
powers to regulate the use of property for community health,
safety, and welfare.4" But the Supreme Court has read the Fifth
Amendment's "Takings Clause" to prohibit the government
from "forcing some people alone to bear public burdens, which
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."14  Regulations that appropriate or take private property
36 Burbank, 411 U.S. at 635 n.14.
37 This letter has proven to be significant in the development of U.S. air law,
providing that:
[Tihe proposed legislation will not affect the rights of a state or
local public agency, as the proprietor of an airport, from issuing
regulations or establishing requirements as to the permissible level
of noise which can be created by aircraft using the airport. Airport
owners acting as proprietors can presently deny the use of their
airports to aircraft on the basis of noise considerations so long as
such exclusion is non-discriminatory.
Id.
38 Id.
39 The FAA in its regulations implementing the Aviation Safety and Noise
Abatement Act of 1979 expressly stated that local land use regulation was not
preempted. 46 Fed. Reg. 8320 (1981) (formerly codified at 14 C.F.R. § 150
(1981)). The regulation now states: "No submittal of a map, or approval or disap-
proval, in whole or part, of any map or program submitted under this part is a
determination concerning the acceptability or unacceptability of that land use
under Federal, State, or local law." 14 C.F.R. § 150.5 (1995).
40 See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Sinclair
Refining Co. v. City of Chicago, 178 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1949).
41 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960).
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for a public use, as distinguished from those which merely regu-
late the use of property, are unconstitutional. Prominent land
use and zoning commentators agree that "takings" jurispru-
dence has been developed by the Supreme Court on almost a
case by case basis:
In literally thousands of cases, state and federal courts have been
called upon to determine whether a particular regulation was
overly burdensome and violated the takings clause. Decisions
and rationales have been widely divergent with resulting uncer-
tainty for all concerned. In recent cases, the Supreme Court it-
self has noted the considerable difficulty it has had in developing
any set formula to determine whether there has been a "regula-
tory taking. "42
The Fifth Amendment provides that private property cannot
be taken for public use without just compensation. 43 The
Supreme Court has decided that this limitation applies to state
and local governments through the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.44 Similar "takings" clauses exist in
state constitutions.
When a "regulatory taking" of private property actually occurs
is a topic of heated debate in U.S. courts and legislatures.45 Re-
cent U.S. Supreme Court decisions indicate a shift toward
greater judicial protection of individual property rights. 46
Courts have begun to invalidate laws that unfairly affect property
interests by inappropriate use of police power. The main theo-
ries used by courts to defend private property against exercises
of police power include presumptions against retroactive legisla-
tion, recognition of vested rights, and application of equitable
estoppel.47
United States Supreme Court decisions in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission,48 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,49
42 Richard J. Roddewig & Christopher J. Duerksen, Responding to the Takings
Challenge, in PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE REPORT No. 416, 1 (1989).
43 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
- Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1887).
45 Edward H. Ziegler, Fundamental Fairness and Regulatory Takings: Judicial Stan-
dards of Fairness Shaping the Limits of Categorical and Partial Taking Claims, 1995
SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMI-
NENT DOMAIN, L5 (1995).
46 Id. at L6.
47 Jan G. Laitos, The Strange Career of Private Property and the Police Power, 2 MIN.
DEv. & LAND USE 32, 32-36 (1995).
48 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that a development exaction requires an "es-
sential nexus" between the regulation and a legitimate public objective).
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and Dolan v. City of Tigard° demonstrate the shift toward greater
judicial protection of private property rights. While the bounda-
ries of greater protection are not completely clear, the decisions
demonstrate the Court's heightened respect for the Fifth
Amendment.51 In addition, states and the federal government
are considering and enacting statutory provisions to provide
compensation to property owners when a "regulatory taking"
occurs.
52
There are no hard and fast rules to determine when a land
use restriction would be considered a "taking." For a number of
years, a regulation was considered a "taking" if it goes "too
far."51 3 The balancing test for "regulatory taking" claims deter-
mined in Pennsylvania Coal was revised and updated by the Penn
Central Transportation Co. decision.54 Now commonly referred to
as the "ad hoc analysis," the Penn Central Transportation Co. court
set forth three primary factors to consider: (1) the character of
49 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that a "categorical taking" occurs when a reg-
ulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land).
50 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (holding there must be "rough proportionality" be-
tween a development exaction and the extent of a development impact creating
the need for the exaction).
51 Justice Rehnquist commented in Dolan: "[W] e see no reason why the "Tak-
ings Clause" of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the
First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a
poor relation in these comparable circumstances." Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320.
52 Recent legislative initiatives in a number of states propose that states should
compensate private property owners for reductions in value caused by public reg-
ulation unless the regulated activity is considered a nuisance under state law.
The State of Washington considered the most radical legislation. By some esti-
mates, Initiative 164, narrowly defeated in November 1995, would have cost local
governments up to $11 billion in compensation costs. The proposed Washington
legislation would have required payment for any action by government that dimin-
ished the value of land, no matter how small the loss. Kim Murphy, Washington
State's Property Rights Proposal Goes Furthest of All. ANN ARBOR NEWS, Oct. 29, 1995,
at A8. A new Texas statute permits compensation or invalidation of the regula-
tion if a regulatory taking diminishes market value of the affected parcel by more
than 25%. Act ofJune 12, 1995, S.B. 14, 74th Leg., 1st C.S. (to be codified at 10
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2007).
53 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). In an often
quoted portion of Pennsylvania Coaljustice Holmes described the determination
of a "regulatory taking" as follows:
When [diminution in value] reaches a certain magnitude, in most
if not all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain the act .... The general rule at least is,
that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if the reg-
ulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.
Id. at 413, 415.
54 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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the government action; (2) the economic impact of the regula-
tion; and (3) the degree to which the regulation interferes with
reasonable investment-backed expectations. 55 "Under the estab-
lished, but still emerging, line of regulatory taking analysis," 56
courts use this updated "ad hoc" test when considering regula-
tory takings.57
Takings challenges are often brought in cases related to air-
ports and airspace. In Griggs v. Allegheny Countyf8 and United
States v. Causby,59 the Supreme Court determined that a land-
owner has a property interest in the airspace above his land.
Since Griggs and Causby, airports have been financially liable for
damages due to noise. In Causby, the Court determined that
physical violation of the airspace interest is a "taking" entitling
the owner to just compensation.6 0 The Court reasoned that an
owner has the right to "at least as much of the space above the
ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the land."6 1
The Griggs case provided a legal framework that places liability
for noise control with the federal government, the local govern-
ments surrounding the airport, and the airport itself.62 Physical
55 Id. at 124.
56 Ziegler, supra note 45, at L14.
57 See, e.g., Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995).
58 369 U.S. 84, reh'g denied, 369 U.S. 857 (1962).
59 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
60 In Causy, military aircraft taking off from a nearby airport passed less than
70 feet over the plaintiffs farm. The Court determined the flights were so low
that they interfered with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his land, constitut-
ing a compensable "taking" under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 266. While the
Court determined a "taking" occurred in Causby, the case is readily distinguish-
able because of its extreme facts. The end of the airport's runway was 2220 feet
from the plaintifffs barn. Id. at 258. Chickens were killed by flying into walls due
to fright. Id. The plaintiff lost over 150 chickens in this manner. Id. See also
Griggs, 369 U.S. at 84 (holding that a taking occurred because of the physical
invasion of airspace over the plaintiff's property by aircraft).
61 Causby, 328 U.S. at 264.
62 The increasing air traffic during the 1960s intensified airport noise
problems and congressional concern for protection of the public. Congress
adopted the Control and Abatement of Aircraft Noise and Sonic Boom Amend-
ment to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 90-411, 82 Stat. 395
(1968) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1988)). For a full discussion of
the development of airport noise law, see Robert J. Rockett, Comment, Airport
Noise: Did the Airport Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 1979 Solve the Problem?, 52 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 499 (1986).
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violation of landowner airspace is a "taking"63 entitling the
owner to compensation.64
C. THE POWER TO ZONE
Land surrounding public airports can be controlled when
courts find that the regulations used by local governments are a
reasonable and proper exercise of police power.65 The determi-
nation of the validity of airport zoning as a reasonable restric-
tion involves the same inquiry that would be used to determine
the validity of comprehensive zoning under Euclid.6 6 Validity de-
pends on two questions: (1) Does the regulation bear a substan-
tial relation to public health, safety, and general welfare? and
(2) is public interest sufficient for the reasonable imposition of
restrictions on property adjacent to an airport, without having
to compensate the owner for the diminution in value?6 w
The test involves weighing the public interest against the indi-
vidual property owner's interest. Some commentators have sug-
gested that the increasingly important interest in air travel as
public transportation and as an avenue of commerce (for
freight and postal deliveries) constitutes a per se public inter-
est.68 Along those same lines, a viable argument can be made
that the substantial public investment in airports is by itself suffi-
cient justification for police power based regulation. 69 Airports'
important role in defense is a similarly viable justification."
However, public safety is an even more direct justification for
using police power for airport zoning. Increasing use of existing
facilities makes unobstructed approaches to airports essential to
public safety. 71
Use of police power is upheld only when the state has dele-
gated authority to local governments through statutes72 or by a
63 For a discussion of "taking" claims see infra notes 48-94 and accompanying
text.
64 See Griggs, 369 U.S. at 90.
65 See Maryland Aviation Admin. v. Newsome, 652 A.2d 116, 121 (Md. 1995);
Town of Brookhaven v. Spadaro, 204 A.D.2d 533 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Com-
monwealth v. Rodgers, 634 A.2d 245 (Pa. 1993).
6 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
67 2 ROBERT ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 12.39 (3d ed. 1986).




72 All states have adopted some form of zoning enabling statute. See the dis-
cussion of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act infra notes 103-06 and accompany-
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constitutional grant of zoning powers.73 Although the federal
government authorized the use of airport zoning through the
Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, the Act was re-
pealed in 1982.71 The current regulations provide that before a
"sponsor" airport is eligible to receive federal funds for planning
or expansion projects, it must show:
(a) [A] ction that it has taken to restrict the use of land adja-
cent to or in the immediate vicinity of the airport to activities and
purposes compatible with normal airport operations including
landing and take-off of aircraft. The sponsors statement must in-
clude information on-
(1) Any property interests (such as airspace easements or title
to airspace) acquired by the sponsor to assure compatible land
use, or to protect or control aerial approaches;
(2) Any zoning laws enacted or in force restricting the use of
land adjacent to or in the vicinity of the airport, or assuring pro-
tection or control of aerial approaches;
(3) Any action taken by the sponsor to induce the appropriate
government authority to enact zoning laws restricting the use of
land adjacent to or in the vicinity of the airport, or assuring pro-
tection or control of aerial approaches, when the sponsor lacks
the power to zone the land.75
Problems can arise, however, when proposed expansion is be-
yond the local government's territorial limits or the airport's
lands are contained in more than one jurisdiction. These
problems are exemplified by Dallas/Fort Worth International
Airport (DFW).76 Before construction of DFW, the cities of Fort
Worth and Dallas maintained separate airports.77 With their ex-
isting airports already at or near capacity, the cities decided to
join forces and build one large regional airport to serve the met-
ing text. See also Yara Eng'g Corp. v. City of Newark, 40 A.2d 559, 560-61 (N.J.
1945) (holding airport zoning regulations invalid because there had been no
authorization by the state to zone land solely for an airport).
73 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365.
74 49 U.S.C. § 1718(4) (1980) (repealed 1982) provided that before funding a
project "the Secretary (of Transportation] shall receive assurances . . . that...
appropriate action, including the adoption of zoning laws, has been or will be
taken, to the extent reasonable, to restrict the use of land adjacent to or in the
immediate vicinity of the airport." Id.
75 14 C.F.R. § 151.26 (1995)
76 For a detailed review of the problems related to the expansion of DFW, see
Cole, supra note 28, at 193-96.
77 City of Dallas v. Southwest Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (N.D. Tex.
1973), affd, 494 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1977).
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ropolitan area.78 DFW was built on property in the cities of
Grapevine, Irving, and Euless. Only a small portion is in the city
of Fort Worth. 79 Within ten years, DFW grew to be one of the
busiest airports in the world."
After learning about the DFW Airport Board's $3.5 billion ex-
pansion plans, the cities of Grapevine, Irving, and Euless en-
acted zoning ordinances which required that the cities approve
any new airport construction within their boundaries.81 The
DFW Airport Board sued the cities seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that their zoning ordinances were preempted by the Texas
Municipal Airports Act (TMAA) and inapplicable to DFW.82
The Dallas district court held that the cities' zoning ordinances
were not preempted by the TMAA or by federal regulations or
statutes.8 3 The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's ruling in March of 1993.84
At the same time in the spring of 1993, the Texas Legislature
passed Senate Bill 348 (S.B. 348), amending the TMAA to spe-
cifically preempt the adjacent cities' authority to regulate
DFW.85 The cities announced immediate plans to challenge the
constitutionality of S.B. 348. DFW responded by filing suit in
78 Id. at 1019-20.
79 Cole, supra note 28, at 195.
80 Passenger trips at DFW grew from 6.8 million in 1974 to 21 million in 1987.
Id. (citing Brief for Appellant at 5, Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd. v. City of
Irving, Tex., 854 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993)).
81 Cole, supra note 28, at 196.
82 See City of Irving v. Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd., 894 S.W.2d 456, 459-
61 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, writ denied).
83 Id. at 460.
84 See Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd. v. City of Irving, 854 S.W.2d 161
(Tex. App.-Dallas), judgment vacated without reference to merits, 868 S.W.2d 750
(Tex. 1993).
85 The language of Senate Bill 348 of 1993 has been codified at TEX. TRANsP.
CODE ANN. § 22.074 (Vernon Supp. 1996). The bill states in part:
(b) A joint board may exercise on behalf of its constituent agen-
cies all the powers of each with respect to an airport, air navigation
facility, or airport hazard area, subject to the limitations of Sections
22.079-22.082.
(c) A joint board may plan, acquire, establish, construct, im-
prove, equip, maintain, operate, regulate, protect, and police an
airport, air navigation facility, or airport hazard area jointly ac-
quired, controlled, and operated. The joint board may also
realign, alter, acquire, abandon, or close a portion of a roadway or
alleyway without a showing of paramount importance if the por-
tions to be realigned, altered, acquired, abandoned, or closed are
in the geographic boundaries of the airport at the time of or after
the realignment, alteration, acquisition, abandonment, or closing.
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Tarrant County seeking a declaratory judgment that the law was
valid and constitutional.
Several months after the Tarrant County suit was filed, the
Texas Supreme Court remanded the earlier suit to the Dallas
County district court with instructions to consider the validity of
applying S.B. 348 to the cities. 6 The Texas Supreme Court pro-
hibited the Tarrant County district court from taking any action
"indirectly or directly" with the remanded case.8 7 Ultimately, af-
ter more clarification from the Texas Supreme Court, both the
Tarrant County and Dallas County district courts ruled that S.B.
348 was constitutional.8 8 The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed
in 1995.89
In City of Grapevine v. Department of Transportation,"° the plain-
tiffs petitioned for the court's review of the FAA's decision to
approve plans to expand DFW and declare portions of the pro-
ject eligible for federal funding. The plaintiffs alleged that the
FAA's exclusion of some elements of the proposed expansion
from the project's required Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) resulted in an inadequate document.9" As a result, the
plaintiffs argued that the FAA failed to consider the environ-
mental impact of all feasible and reasonable alternatives in viola-
tion of the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) .92
The plaintiffs also claimed that the FAA had failed to consider
the environmental impact of the expansion of historic proper-
ties as defined in section 4(f) of the Department of Transporta-
A taking of a right-of-way that occurs in the exercise of this power
shall be compensated at fair market value.
(d) If the constituent agencies of a joint board are populous
home-rule municipalities, a power described by Subsection (c) is
exclusively the power of the board regardless of whether all or part
of the airport, air navigation facility, or airport hazard area is lo-
cated in or outside the territory of any of the constituent agencies.
Another local government or other political subdivision may not
enact or enforce a zoning ordinance, subdivision regulation, con-
struction code, or other ordinance purporting to regulate the use
or development of property applicable in the geographic bounda-
ries of the airport as it may be expanded.
86 TEX. TRANsp. CODE ANN. § 22.074 (Vernon Supp. 1996). See Dallas/Fort
Worth Int'l Airport Bd. v. City of Irving, 868 S.W.2d 750 (Tex. 1993).
87 Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport Bd., 868 S.W.2d at 751.
88 City of Irving, 894 S.W.2d at 459-61.
89 See id. at 459.
90 17 F.3d 1502 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 635 (1994).
9' Id. at 1503.
92 Id. at 1503 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 4231-4370 (1994)).
19961 257
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
tion (DOT) Act9" and that the FAA had failed to complete the
review required by the National Historic Preservation Act
(NHPA)94 prior to rendering a final decision.95
The court dismissed the plaintiffs' argument that the FAA ex-
cluded substantive portions of the Airport Layout Plan (ALP)
from its review9 6 and found the plaintiffs' attempt to require the
EIS to address categorically-exempt items without merit.97 The
plaintiffs also contended that the FAA had approved the project
before completion of the reviews required by the NHPA.98 The
FAA had conditioned its final approval of the west runway on a
subsequent reevaluation of its effect on the historic properties,
noting that it would consider the results of the consultation pro-
cess required by statute.99 The court dismissed the plaintiffs' ar-
gument because the FAAs conditional approval did not violate
the requirements of the NHPA because it did not "approve the
expenditure of any Federal funds." 100
The DFW cases confirm the principle that police power based
regulations are normally upheld if provided for by state legisla-
tive act. Courts generally abide by the decisions of administra-
tive agencies charged with enforcing legislation as long as
decisions are "reasonably supported by substantial evidence." 101
A number of states have adopted enabling statutes that expressly
grant or restrict authority to local governments to adopt airport
zoning regulations.10 2
93 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1983).
9,1 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470w-6 (1988); see also 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.4(b), 800.4(c),
800.5 (1995).
95 City of Grapevine, 17 F.3d at 1503.
96 Id. at 1505.
97 Id. at 1506.
98 Id. at 1508.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1509.
101 See, e.g., Pickens v. Railroad Comm'n, 387 S.W.2d 35, 45 (Tex. 1965).
102 The following states have adopted statutes specifically granting authority to
adopt airport zoning regulations: ALA. CODE § 4-6-4(a),(b) (1995); ALASKA STAT.
§ 02.25.020 (1995); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2-324 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-
359-113 (Michie 1995); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 50485.3 (West 1995); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 15-91 (West 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 333.03 (West 1995); HAw. REv.
STAT. § 262-3 (1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 620, para. 13 (Smith-Hurd 1996); IND.
CODE ANN. § 14(d) (West 1996); IowA CODE ANN. § 329.3 (West 1995); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 3-703 (1994); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 183.867 (Baldwin 1995); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 381 (West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 241 (West 1995);
MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 5-502 (1995); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 259.445 (West
1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 360.063 (West 1996); Miss. CODE ANN. § 61-3-81
(1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 67.1203 (Vernon 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 67-6-201
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One test for the validity of a zoning action is whether or not
the action is consistent with the comprehensive plan if a plan is
required by the enabling statute. The Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act (SZEA)103 states that all zoning and regulation of
land should be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan. 1 0 4
Most states have adopted some form of the SZEA to authorize
local planning.10 5 While the SZEA contemplates adoption of an
optional "master plan" containing community goals and policies
to guide development, the "comprehensive plan" requirement
is a mandatory prerequisite to the adoption of zoning
regulations.106
The "in accordance with" requirement has not resulted in a
consistent judicial interpretation of what constitutes a compre-
hensive plan. Some experts suggest that the commentary to the
Act merely requires that zoning not be done in a "piecemeal"
manner.10 7 The majority view"" is that a comprehensive plan
must reasonably relate zoning regulations to the public health,
safety, and welfare, but the majority view does not require a doc-
ument separate from the zoning regulations themselves. 10 9 Be-
cause courts traditionally did not require comprehensive plans
to be independent documents, plans eluded precise definition.
(1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 424:5 (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-39-20 (Michie
1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-31 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 2-04-03 (1995); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4563.031 (Baldwin 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 103 (West
1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 836.310 (1995); 74 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5912 (1995);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 1-3-5 (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 50-6A-21 (1995); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 42-6-103 (1995); TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 241.011 (Vernon
1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 2-4-3(i) (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1004 (1995);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 14.12.030 (West 1995).
103 STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce Re-
vised Ed. 1926) [hereinafter STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT].
104 Footnote 22 of the Act states that the "in accordance" requirement "will
prevent haphazard or piecemeal zoning. No zoning should be done without
such a comprehensive study." Id. § 3.
105 Charles Haar, In Accordance With A Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARv. L. REv.
1154, 1155 (1955).
106 STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING AcT, supra note 103, § 12.
107 DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 3.14, 82 (2d ed. 1988).
108 See id. § 3.15, 82.
109 The leading case representing this view is Kozesnik v. Township of Mont-
gomery, 131 A.2d 1 (NJ. 1957); see also Theobald v. Board of County Comm'r,
644 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1982); Furtney v. Simsbury Zoning Comm'n, 271 A.2d 319
(Conn. 1970).
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Courts generally require at a minimum some evidence of com-
prehensive planning before validating zoning regulations. 110
The trend in states with relatively new planning legislation is
toward "consistency" requirements that mandate local adoption
of a "master" plan and that require zoning regulations be consis-
tent with the adopted plan."' Some states also mandate the
content and elements of local plans and regulate their amend-
ment procedures. Mandatory consistency strengthens the uni-
form application of zoning regulation and local land use
planning efforts.' 12
D. THE COMPREHENSIVE OR "MASTER" PLAN AS A LAND
USE CONTROL
Comprehensive or "master" plans developed in conjunction
with zoning regulations serve as blueprints for future commu-
nity growth. The term "master plan" comes from the Standard
City Planning Enabling Act (SPEA). 1 3 Plans generally contain a
number of standard characteristics and account for all the geo-
graphic characteristics. The most influential policy of the SPEA
was that planning was optional." 4 The optional requirement,
110 Consistency generally means that a comprehensive plan should be some-
thing more than a reflection of existing zoning ordinances. See Wolf v. City of
Ely, 493 N.W.2d 846 (Iowa 1992) (holding that a city failed to properly adopt a
zoning ordinance "in accordance with" a comprehensive plan when the plan was
nothing more than various plans and maps with no legislative adoption).
II California and Florida are among the leading states requiring plan and zon-
ing "consistency." The movement to stronger master planning has been largely
in response to growth management concerns. When a state statute does not de-
fine consistency, courts have developed their own rules to determine when zon-
ing is consistent with a comprehensive plan. See MANDELKER, supra note 107,
§ 3.17.
112 See, e.g., S.A. Healy Co. v. Town of Highland Beach, 355 So. 2d 813 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (sustaining single-family zoning in a resort area stating: "Our
State Legislature, in recognition of the need to strengthen the role of local gov-
ernment in the establishment and implementation of the comprehensive plan-
ning process adopted the [consistency requirements] ..... Id. at 815).
I1s The SPEA provides in part:
It shall be the function of [local governments] to make and adopt a
master plan for the physical development of the municipality ....
Such plan, with the accompanying maps, plats, charts, and descrip-
tive matter shall show the [local government's] recommendations
for ... development.., including... aviation fields... as well as a
zoning plan for the control of the height, area, bulk, location, and
the use of buildings and premises.
STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING AcT § 6 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce 1928).
114 Id. § 13. The language of the SPEA is permissive except that the adoption
of a major street plan is a mandatory prerequisite to approval of subdivisions.
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combined with the fact that the public demand for zoning
prompted publication of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act two
years before the SPEA, resulted in early failures to integrate
planning and zoning.1 1 5 While some states today have made
planning mandatory, 16 most have followed the SPEA "optional"
format.117 Courts hold that adoption and implementation of
zoning ordinances does not depend on the adoption of a com-
prehensive plan." 8
Optional planning makes the enactment of zoning regula-
tions under a "self containment" view possible, but many courts
look for separate community planning efforts to justify zoning
regulations. 9 The validity of zoning may not depend on sepa-
rate planning documents, but courts will give weight to planning
studies that have been documented and adopted by local gov-
ernments,12 0 upholding plans that are clearly written12 1 and up-
to-date.1 22 Conversely, the lack of independent planning may
115 See MANDELKER, supra note 107, § 3.05.
116 Id.
117 Most states have enacted planning enabling statutes modeled after the
SPEA authorizing optional planning by local governments. Haar, supra note 105,
at 1155.
118 See, e.g., Kozesnik, 131 A.2d at 1, where the NewJersey Supreme Court found
a zoning ordinance amendment permitting a quarrying operation invalid be-
cause it unreasonably and arbitrarily discriminated between improved and unim-
proved property. But the court rejected the plaintiffs contention that zoning
regulations must be in accordance with a comprehensive plan evidenced by a
writing outside of the zoning ordinance itself stating:
It is thus clear that the 'comprehensive plan' of the zoning statute
is not identical with the 'master plan' of the Planning Act and need
not meet the formal requirements of a master plan. The Zoning
Act nowhere provides that the comprehensive plan shall exist in
some physical form outside the ordinance itself.
Id. at 7.
119 See infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
120 An often cited example is Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y.),
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) (holding that development in some areas
of a community can be delayed until adequate public services are available based
on the city's substantial comprehensive planning efforts); see also Biske v. City of
Troy, 166 N.W.2d 453 (Mich. 1969) (holding that a formally adopted master plan
does not invalidate a zoning regulation, but does weaken the presumption of
validity of a zoning ordinance or amendment).
121 A plan must provide clear guidelines. E.g., Board of Supervisors v.Jackson,
269 S.E.2d 381 (Va. 1980).
122 Plans generally must be current. See, e.g., Town of Bedford v. Village of Mt.
Kisco, 306 N.E.2d 155 (N.Y. 1973) (refusing to give weight to an outdated plan to
support a multi-family rezoning).
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weaken the presumption of validity usually accorded to zoning
regulations even though separate planning is not mandated. 123
IV. DEFENSIBLE COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING FOR
LAND AROUND AIRPORTS
As this Comment suggests, the number of approaches avail-
able to local governments and airport management to regulate
property around airports varies depending on site and jurisdic-
tional factors. State statutes delegating police powers, govern-
ment control, and management of the airport, in combination
with precedential case law affecting regulatory efforts, vary the
methods that can be utilized to regulate safety, noise control,
and future expansion. Establishing effective regulations typi-
cally begins with comprehensive planning.
Comprehensive planning for community development is an
accepted fact in most urban areas of the United States. Most
cities maintain a "planning" or "community development" de-
partment charged with comprehending the "whole urban prob-
lem."'24 The department prepares the city's plans and zoning
regulations for plan implementation. The objectives of plan-
ning include:
(1) To improve the physical environment of the community as a
setting for human activities-to make it more functional, beauti-
ful, decent, healthful, interesting, and efficient ... (2) [t]o pro-
mote the public interest, the interest of the community at large,
rather than the interests of individuals or special groups within
the community ... (3) [to facilitate the democratic determina-
tion and implementation of community policies on physical de-
velopment... (4) [t] o effect political and technical coordination
in community development... (5) [t]o inject long-range consid-
erations into the determination of short-range actions ... [and]
(6) [t]o bring professional and technical knowledge to bear on
the making of political decisions concerning the physical devel-
opment of the community. 125
Comprehensive plan preparation basically follows four major
steps: "(1) the formation of goals and objectives, (2) the making
of basic research studies, (3) the drafting of the plan, and (4)
123 See, e.g., Forestview Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Cook, 309 N.E.2d
763, 773 (Ill. 1974) (holding that the failure of Cook County to plan comprehen-
sively weakened the presumption of validity that would otherwise attach to zoning
ordinances).
124 4 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 23.02 (3d ed. 1986).
12 Id. § 23.04 (quoting T.J. KENT, JR., THE URBAN PLAN 38 (1964)).
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implementation of the plan."12 6 Effective planning generally
follows these guidelines. Airport planning, however, requires a
higher level of intergovernmental coordination because of the
jurisdictional complexity that accompanies the location and ex-
pansion of airports. 12 7 The minority of states mandating plan-
ning require detailed plans for airports, while also providing
statutory authorization for airport zoning regulations.128 For air-
ports not located in mandatory planning states, a preferable op-
tion for planning is to follow the guidelines recommended by
the American Law Institute in the ALI Model Land Develop-
ment Code.1 29
A. ALl MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE
The ALl Model Land Development Code makes planning op-
tional except when local governments want to adopt more so-
phisticated land use controls. 130  The ALI planning
requirements are comprehensive, following the planning crite-
ria of even the most demanding state statutes.' 31 If adopted by
126 Id. § 23.05. Most communities follow some form of the basic steps outlined
by Anderson. Variation is required based on differences in enabling legislation,
community funding available for planning, and sophistication of the staff avail-
able to prepare the plan.
127 Creswell, supra note 1, at 9.
128 For example, § 333, Florida Statutes mandates that local governments with
"airport hazard" areas adopt airport zoning regulations. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 333.03(1)(a)-(b) (West 1996). In cases where the airport is operated by or lo-
cated in a different political subdivision than that adjacent to the airport, the
statute provides that inter-local agreements or joint planning efforts be under-
taken to enact airport zoning regulations. Id. The statute also requires at a mini-
mum that airport zoning include variance requirements for any proposed
structures that would exceed federal obstruction standards. Id. § 333.03(1) (c).
Florida regulations also provide that the most stringent zoning regulations pre-
vail in the event of conflicts. Id. § 333.04.
129 MODEL LAND DEV. CODE (Am. Law Inst. 1976) [hereinafter MODEL LAND
DEV. CODE].
-30 Section 2-201(2)(h) provides for development in specially planned areas
only in accordance with a precise plan and only if the requirements of § 2-211 are
met. Section 2-211 allows local governments to designate "specially planned ar-
eas" to be developed in a coordinated manner. Development will be held up
until the local government "adopts by rule a precise plan." After a precise plan is
adopted, an owner may obtain a development permit consistent with the plan.
Landowners seeking development permission that is inconsistent with the plan
may file a written petition for adoption or amendment of the plan. The local
government agency has six months to issue an order related to the proposed
change or the change automatically is adopted. Id. § 2-201(2) (h).
11 Plans for airports and surrounding areas should follow statutory require-
ments for individual states and follow the recommendations in the ALI Model
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local governments, the ALI provisions create a continuous plan-
ning process that addresses some of the criticisms leveled at end-
state planning. 13 2 The ALI Code provides an option to use text
policies, maps, or a combination of both in comprehensive
plans. 133
One of the primary benefits of using the ALI approach is
designating an airport as a "Specially Planned Area" under pro-
visions in the Model Code.13 4 Originally contemplated to be ap-
Land Development Code Section 3-103. MODEL LAND DEV. CODE, supra note 129,
§ 3-103.
132 Plans prepared under the SPEA and SZEA are often criticized as assuming a
rigid pattern of land development that proceeds on a lot-by-lot basis. Of course,
this is almost never the case in practice. Development is affected by market con-
ditions. Plans are often out of date by the time they make it out of the approval
process. The ALI Model Code tries to address these problems by encouraging
the compilation of a wide amount of information and creating a "land develop-
ment plan" rather than a more traditional "comprehensive plan." See
MANDELKER, supra note 107, § 3.13.
133 MODEL LAND DEV. CODE, supra note 129, § 3-101(1).
134 A "Specially Planned Area" under the ALI Model Code works as follows:
(1) A development ordinance may authorize the Land Develop-
ment Agency to designate by rule any specially planned area in
which development will be permitted only in accordance with a
plan of development for the entire area.
(2) A specially planned area shall be designated only for areas
which a Land Development Plan determines should be developed
in a coordinated manner in order to achieve the objectives of the
plan.
(3) If a specially planned area has been designated no develop-
ment in the area shall be permitted until the Land Development
Agency adopts by rule a precise plan for the area, which may in-
clude provisions relating to
(a) the location and characteristics of streets, other rights of
way, and utilities;
(b) the dimensions and grading of parcels and the dimen-
sions and siting of structures;
(c) the location and characteristics of the permissible types of
development; and
(d) any other planning matters which contribute to the devel-
opment and use of the area as a whole.
(4) After a precise plan has been adopted the precise plan shall
constitute the development regulations applicable to the specially
planned area, and any owner of land in a specially planned area for
which a precise plan has been adopted may obtain a development
permit for development consistent with the precise plan upon com-
pliance with the requirements of this Article.
(5) Any landowner seeking development permission in a spe-
cially planned area for which no precise plan has been adopted, or
seeking development permission for development consistent with
an adopted precise plan, shall, prior to filing an application for
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plied to "undeveloped land" or "redevelopment" areas,"3 5 the
designation could be effectively applied to land surrounding air-
ports. The "Specially Planned Area" criteria and resulting "pre-
cise plan" would lay an excellent foundation to support the
validity of airport overlay zoning regulations. "Specially Planned
Areas" stop issuance of development permits from the time of
designation until a "precise plan" is adopted. The regulation
also provides a remedy for landowners where a "precise plan"
has not yet been adopted or where the owner seeks to develop
in a manner inconsistent with the "precise plan."13
6
Development of a "precise plan" should take into account as-
pects specific to airport planning. The plan should permit land
development of certain areas while also considering flight zones
and noise impacts. The plan should identify areas for future
airport acquisition and expansion, prohibiting development in-
consistent with future plans.1 37 But the plan must also provide
for continuance or non-continuance of non-conforming uses ex-
isting in the area at the time the plan is enacted.1 38
Because plans have been invalidated without such statements,
plans should also contain statements of trends, objectives, poli-
cies, and standards.1 39 They also should be designed to include
development permission, file with the Land Development Agency a
written request for the adoption or amendment of a precise plan
for the area, which request may contain part or all of a proposed
precise plan for the area.
The Agency shall give notice of the written request under § 2-
305.
(6) Within six months after filing of a written request under sub-
section (5) the Land Development Agency shall adopt a precise
plan or amended precise plan for the specially planned area, or
shall issue an order refusing to approve or amend an existing pre-
cise plan. If no such action is taken within six months any precise
plan filed by a landowner shall be treated as having been adopted
in regard to his land.
Id. § 2-211.
135 Id. (see the advisory note after the proposed statute text).
136 Id.
137 Following the logic of the MODEL LAND DEv. CODE, supra note 129, § 3-201.
138 Because of the tremendous amount of existing development around major
U.S. airports, the provisions for the existence of non-conforming uses is of major
importance to any airport land use planning efforts. The ALI Code provides one
option for handling this sensitive issue in § 4-101.
139 See, e.g., Holmes v. Planning Bd., 78 A.D.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); see also
Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy, 116 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. 1962) (court struck
down large-lot zoning partly because it did not accept the town plan's population
limitation).
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both a short (often five years) and long term development pro-
gram with estimates of the land acquisition needed to carry out
the plan.14 ° Most importantly, the plan should be adopted by
the airport administrative agency and the regulatory local gov-
ernment in strict compliance with any state statutory
requirements.1 4 1
B. CASE LAW RELATED TO COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING
Courts will generally uphold challenges to plans on "takings"
grounds when the disputed plan is based on rational and thor-
ough planning. Courts have invalidated zoning ordinances
when they do not conform to comprehensive plans. In Pen-
nington County v. Moore,1 42 the defendants operated a twenty-acre
auto salvage yard. The county sued the defendants for operat-
ing their business in violation of a county zoning ordinance.
The Moores argued that the ordinance was not effective because
it was not adopted under a valid comprehensive zoning plan as
required by state law.143 The county argued that the Moores ac-
quiesced in the zoning ordinance even if it was enacted under a
legally defective comprehensive plan.144 The trial court ruled
for the Moores, allowing their challenge to the zoning ordi-
nance. The South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court and invalidated the ordinance because it was not adopted
in accordance with the comprehensive plan and declared the
property unzoned.1 45
In a recent Missouri case, State ex rel. Chiavola v. Village of Oak-
wood, 1 46 property owners challenged the village's zoning ordi-
nance on statutory and constitutional grounds. The ordinance
dated back to 1955 and was adopted shortly after a housing sub-
division had been incorporated into a village. The ordinance
provided for only single-family residential use on large lots. The
plaintiffs in Chiavola sought to rezone about five acres on a ma-
140 MODEL LAND DEV. CODE, supra note 129, § 3-105.
141 The potential rigidity that can result when the comprehensive plan must be
adopted and amended by legislative process is illustrated by a California decision
where an opponent of the plan sought its repeal by the legislative body or submis-
sion to referendum. The court described the plan as a "constitution for all future
development within the city" and held that it was subject to the referendum pro-
cess. O'Loane v. O'Rourke, 231 Cal. App. 2d 774 (1965).
142 525 N.W.2d 257 (S.D. 1994).
143 Id. at 257.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 260.
146 886 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1724 (1995).
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jor thoroughfare from residential to commercial. The village
denied the rezoning. On appeal, the circuit court reversed the
village, holding the zoning ordinance invalid because Oakwood
had not previously adopted a comprehensive plan in accord-
ance with state statutes and finding the ordinance could not be
both the zoning plan and zoning ordinance. 147
On further appeal, the court of appeals reversed, finding the
ordinance constitutional and in compliance with statutory re-
quirements. 4 8 The court allowed the village's plan to be in-
ferred from the ordinance, reasoning that the village could plan
for a small residential community and exclude business and in-
dustry based on health, safety, and welfare concerns. 149 The
court concurred with decisions from other states that stand for
the proposition that a plan separate from the zoning ordinance
is not required.' The resultingrule from this case requires
courts to "determine on an ad hoc basis whether [a city's] ef-
forts to meet the requirement of creating a general plan to con-
trol and direct the use and development of property in a
municipality" has been met.'5 1 The failure of the court in this
case to require a plan may be the result of the small nature of
the community. The holding in the case may be limited by dicta
stating that an ordinance similar to Oakwood's might not meet
the needs of a larger or more complex community to satisfy the
state requirement that its zoning regulations conform with a
comprehensive plan.1 52
In Little v. Winborn,153 the Supreme Court of Iowa struck down
a rezoning action by Scott County as illegal spot zoning. The
rezoning would have permitted the location of a shooting range
and two buildings in a large area qualifying as prime agricultural
land. The court found the rezoning to be inconsistent with the
county's comprehensive plan and policies to protect prime agri-
cultural land from scattered development.1 54 The court empha-
sized the integral role of the comprehensive plan in analyzing
rezonings by concluding that "spot zoning for the benefit of the
147 Id. at 75.
148 Id. at 76.
149 Id. at 77-78.
150 Id. at 79.
15, Id. at 82.
152 Id.
153 518 N.W.2d 384 (Iowa 1994).
154 Id. at 388-89.
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owner and contrary to the comprehensive plan is
unreasonable." 155
In the recent Montana Supreme Court case of Bridger Canyon
Property Owners' Ass'n v. Planning and Zoning Commission for the
Bridger Canyon Zoning District,156 neighboring property owners
sued the planning commission seeking reversal of a 651 acre re-
zoning of a Planned Unit Development (PUD) permitting con-
struction of recreational housing. The property owner's
association contended that the rezoning was void as a matter of
law because the planning commission lacked the authority and
jurisdiction to approve the PUD because of a conflict between
the zoning ordinance and the Bridger Canyon General Plan.1 57
The court held:
"To require strict compliance with the master plan would result
in a master plan so unworkable that it would have to be con-
stantly changed to comply with the realities. The master plan is,
after all, a plan. On the other hand, to require no compliance at
all would defeat the whole idea of planning.... The statutes are
clear enough to send the message that in reaching zoning deci-
sions, the local governmental unit should at least substantially
comply with the comprehensive plan (or master plan).""'8
The court in Bridger further recognized that while the master
plan may have to be modified as the result of changed circum-
stances, the "correct procedure is to amend the master plan
rather than erode the master plan by simply refusing to adhere
to its guidelines. 1 59
The Connecticut case of City of Bridgeport v. Town of Stratford6 °
exemplifies the complicated issues related to development con-
trol of land surrounding airports. The City of Bridgeport oper-
ates the Sikorsky Memorial Airport which is located in Stratford,
Connecticut.' 6 1 Bridgeport sued Stratford, alleging that Strat-
ford had failed to include the airport in its comprehensive plan
and adopt zoning regulations pertaining to the airport, result-
ing in the loss of federal grants. 162 Bridgeport cited Connecticut
155 Id. at 388.
156 890 P.2d 1268 (Mont. 1995).
157 Id. at 1269-70.
158 Id. at 1273-74 (quoting Little v. Board of County Comm'n, 631 P.2d 1282,
1293 (Mont. 1981)).
159 Id. at 1274.
160 No. CV89 25 71 40 S., 1994 WL 613373 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 21, 1994).
161 Id. at *1.
162 Id.
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statutes mandating that a municipality with an airport within its
territorial limits must adopt zoning regulations.163
The case arose because developers had purchased property
with the intent to build in an area identified by the Greater
Bridgeport Regional Planning Agency as a proposed "airport im-
pact zone" to restrict and exclude development. 16 4 While the
merits of the decision were not finally decided because of stand-
ing issues, 165 the case is illustrative of the issues related to devel-
opment control around airports. Under the current "property
rights friendly" takings climate, 66 cities and counties with air-
ports within their boundaries should help themselves avoid lia-
bility by adopting well conceived planning and zoning
regulations.
V. OVERLAY ZONING AS AN IMPLEMENTATION TOOL
A. OVEIRAY ZONING
Overlay zones have existed since the first zoning ordinance
was adopted in the City of New York.1 67 Local governments
adopt and administer zoning ordinances as a means of imple-
menting comprehensive plans. Courts were slow in recognizing
the relationship between comprehensive planning and zon-
ing. 68 The overlay zone is a separate zoning provision mapped
over an existing zoning district in order to add new regulations
to the underlying zone.' 69 Overlay zones are used to protect ar-
eas with special needs and characteristics, such as airport height,
building and noise requirements, floodplains, wetlands, and his-
toric districts. 70  Overlays are sometimes used to encourage
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at *4.
166 See discussion of taking claims, supra notes 42-63 and accompanying text.
167 Overlay zones applied to special height districts although the term was not
used as such. New York City, N.Y., Zoning Resolution of 1916, § 8 (1916).
168 For a long time after the Supreme Court decision in Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365,
courts held that comprehensive land use planning policies expressed in zoning
ordinances satisfied planning requirements as discussed supra notes 100-07. This
is the majority rule today, but many jurisdictions are moving toward and follow
the rule that requires a comprehensive or land use plan to be a separate docu-
ment from a zoning ordinance. See, e.g., Wolf, 493 N.W.2d at 846; Fasano v.
Board of County Comm'r, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973). See also supra notes 153-55 and
accompanying text.
169 Standards For Overlay Zoning Districts, ZONING NEWS (American Planning As-
sociation), Aug. 1991, at 1 [hereinafter Overlay Districts].
170 Id. at 1.
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newer forms of development, including planned unit develop-
ment or neotraditional towns. Overlay zones are normally
mapped over selected zoning districts and apply sophisticated
regulatory techniques. 171 Administrative complexities vary with
the subject matter being regulated by the zone. The advantages
of overlay zoning are:
(1) Boundaries of overlay zones fit into the affected area with-
out having to consider the boundaries of existing or proposed
land uses or property lines.1 72
(2) Overlay zones are a simple, but effective, way to permit dif-
ferent uses and regulation of development within the confines
of conventional zoning.
(3) Overlay zones are easier politically and administratively to
adopt than rezonings or overall amendments of development
regulations by the supervising government.
The disadvantages of overlay techniques are:
(1) Overlay zoning adds another layer of regulation and review
to property.
(2) Unless carefully conceived, overlay zoning can significantly
curtail the reasonable use of property creating overregulation
that could lead to a regulatory takings claim. 173
Most airport overlay zoning ordinances are the result of im-
plementation of title I of the Aviation Safety and Noise Abate-
ment Act of 1979 (ASNA) and its subsequent amendments.1 74
The amended ASNA provisions established the parameters for
measuring airport-generated noise, a system for determining ex-
posure to airport-generated noise, and an airport noise compati-
bility planning program including the following:
(1) Development and submission to FAA of Noise Exposure
Maps and Noise Compatibility Programs by airport operators;
(2) standard noise units, methods, and analytical techniques for
use in airport assessments;
171 Some of these techniques include floor area ratios, vertical setbacks, archi-
tectural standards, and special design or building requirements. In the context
of airport regulation they are used extensively for protection from noise, both in
establishing special development setbacks and in building noise insulation re-
quirements. Id. at 2.
172 This is a particular advantage to property regulation resulting from the vi-
cinity of an airport. The area mapped by the overlay can be the result of runway
noise contour maps or expansion plans, or a combination of factors. Id.
173 See discussion of taking claims supra notes 43-64 and accompanying text.
174 The act as amended is codified at 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 4750147507 (West Supp.
1995).
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(3) identification of land uses that are compatible, incompati-
ble, or compatible with modification with various levels of noise
around airports; and
(4) procedures and criteria for FAA review and approval of
noise compatibility programs. 75
Participation in the federal program makes local operators of
airports eligible for federal funding of noise compatibility plan-
ning and development. Over 200 airports in the United States
participate in the program, most having some form of regula-
tion based on noise. 176
Overlay zoning regulations, like any other zoning regulations,
must be rationally related to the health, safety, and welfare of
the community to be sustained legally.17 7 If conflicts arise be-
tween the requirements of the overlay zoning and the underly-
ing district, overlays generally prevail because they are usually
the more specific and restrictive regulation. 7  An overlay dis-
trict is also very flexible because it may be tailored to apply only
to the targeted property and facilities. 179 While overlay zoning is
expensive to implement, it is far less costly than the purchase of
sites or buildings through condemnation.18 0
B. CASE LAW RELATED TO OVERLAY ZONING
While a number of cities and states have enacted overlay zon-
ing,'"" relatively few court decisions concerning the enforceabil-
175 Id.
176 Papsidero, supra note 10, at 4. See, e.g., FAIRFAX COUNTY VA., CODE OF ORDI-
NANCES § 7-400 (1977). The airport noise impact zone controls conflicts between
land uses and noise generated by aircraft by limiting property use, tailoring bulk
regulations, and setting maximum interior noise levels for different land use
categories.
177 See the discussion of zoning ordinances supra notes 65-73 and accompany-
ing text.
178 See, e.g., Franchise Developers, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 505 N.E.2d 966, 970-71
(Ohio 1987) (ordinance at issue provided that the overlay district prevails if the
two zoning regulations conflict).
179 See, e.g., A-S-P Assoc. v. City of Raleigh, 258 S.E.2d 444, 455-57 (N.C. 1979)
(ninety-eight acre historic overlay zone did not apply to modem building).
180 Overlay Districts, supra note 169, at 2.
181 See, e.g., ATLANTA, GA., CITY CODE ch. 22, §§ 16-22.001-.004 (1980); CLARK
COUNTY, NEV., CODE ch. 29, §§ 29.50.010-29.51.090 (1981); FAIRFAX COUNTY, VA.,
CODE pt. 4, § 7-100 (Supp. 1982); OKLAHoMA CITY, OKLA., MUNICIPAL CODE art.
II, § 25-11.1 (1977); OMAHA, NEB., MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES ch. 55, §§ 55-691-701
(1987); PENSACOLA, FLA., MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES ch. XI., §§ 1-11 (1986); SALT
LAKE COUNTY, CODE ch. 19, § 19.70 (1989); TUCSON, ARIZ., MUNICIPAL ORDI-
NANCES div. 24, §§ 23-341-449 (1990).
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ity of overlay regulations exists.'8 2 The enforceability of overlays
will undoubtedly be affected by the new takings jurisprudence
established by the U.S. Supreme Court."8 3
An Ohio Supreme Court case, Franchise Developers v. City of Cin-
cinnati,184 upheld an overlay zoning ordinance that limited and
excluded certain commercial uses to preserve and revitalize cer-
tain neighborhoods in Cincinnati, Ohio.1 8 5  The court in
Franchise Developers reversed an appeals court ruling that the
overlay district in question was unconstitutional.1 8 6 The court
found "the overlay zoning scheme ... constitutes a proper exer-
cise of the city's zoning authority in its attempt to preserve and
protect the character of certain neighborhoods."'87
More recently, in Harris v. City of Wichita,'8 8 landowners chal-
lenged restrictions imposed by the City of Wichita that placed
use restrictions on land at the ends of the runway at McConnell
Air Force Base." 9 The plaintiffs owned land located in an Air-
port Overlay Zoning District (AOZD). The landowners argued
that the regulations created a taking of their property and that
the risk of a crash was so small that "it does not warrant any
usage restrictions beyond the existing zoning regulations." 9 ° In
holding that the AOZD regulations constituted a reasonable ex-
ercise of police power, the court determined the city had a legit-
imate interest in seeing "that in the event of an aircraft accident,
as few people as possible are killed or injured."' 91
Harris is also important in the takings context in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard,'92 which es-
tablished the "rough proportionality" nexus test for develop-
ment exactions.1 9 3 After Dolan was decided, the plaintiffs in
182 Courts will generally sustain a zoning ordinance unless "its provisions are
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare." Euclid, 272 U.S. at 396. See also Nectow
v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 189 (1928).
183 See discussion supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
184 505 N.E.2d 966 (Ohio 1987).
185 Id. at 971.
186 Id. at 970.
187 Id. at 971.
18 862 F. Supp. 287 (D. Kan. 1994), affJd without opinion, 74 F.3d 1249 (10th
Cir. 1996).
189 Id. at 289.
190 Id. at 292.
191 Id.
192 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); see discussion supra notes 50-52 and accompanying
text.
193 Id. at 2312.
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Harris filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging the new stan-
dard established in Dolan should apply to Harris. The district
court denied the motion, finding the Dolan "rough proportion-
ality" standard applicable in the context of development exac-
tions, but not to the facts in Harris.194
In another recent decision, overlay zoning to protect property
adjacent to an airport was found a proper application of police
power. In Maryland Aviation Administration v. Newsome,195 the
Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld a state statute that permit-
ted overlay zoning on the area surrounding the Baltimore-Wash-
ington International (BWI) Airport for environmental noise
control.19 6 The case arose when the state denied the plaintiff a
variance to construct twenty-seven homes in the airport overlay
zone.19
7
The plaintiff in Newsome had purchased a development site
near BWI in 1989 which included property zoned M-2 (indus-
trial manufacturing) and a portion of R-12 (a residential cate-
gory) zoned property.1 98 Twenty-seven unimproved residential
lots, 6.3 acres of the site, were located within the BWI noise over-
lay district. 199 As a state owned airport, BWI had established
noise overlay zoning in 1975 as part the Maryland Environmen-
tal Noise Act of 1974 o.20 The property in question was located
within the BWI noise overlay as designated by the state aviation
division in 1988.01
The plaintiff requested a permit to construct the residences,
one per lot, but was denied by the Maryland Aviation Adminis-
tration (MAA). State law prohibited the MAA from granting a
permit when the proposed action violated local land use or zon-
ing laws or enlarged an impacted noise zone. 2  The plaintiff
requested and was denied a variance from the Board of Airport
'94 Harris, 862 F. Supp. at 293.
195 652 A.2d 116 (Md. App. 1995).
196 Id.; MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. §§ 801-824 (1977 & Supp. 1994) (effective
Aug. 6, 1975); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 11, §§ 03.03.01-.06 (1994).
197 Newsome, 652 A.2d at 118-21.
198 Id. at 117.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id. "In addition to measurements of actual sound, noise zone delineation
includes projections of future flight operations. The 1988 BWI noise study pro-
jected increased operations to the west of BWI, in the direction of the property."
Id.
202 MD. CODE ANN., TRa.sp. § 821(c) (1977).
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Zoning Appeals.20 " The plaintiff filed suit and the circuit court
reversed the Board and directed that a variance be granted sub-
ject to conditions. 4 The MAA appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals which affirmed the circuit court.2 0 5
The Maryland Supreme Court accepted certiorari to decide
"whether the noise zone statutes and regulations allow 'the
Board to consider the high population density resulting from a
developer's application for a variance.' 20 6 The court found that
state regulation of land use adjacent to airports was grounded in
state law and was intended by the State to "protect the health
and general welfare of the occupants of land near airports."20 7
Newsome therefore stands for the proposition that well designed
overlay districts, with the support of state law, will be sustained
by courts.
In Commonwealth v. Rogers,208 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
upheld a state statute requiring approval of the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Transportation (PDOT) after the plaintiff erected a
ninety-five foot sign in an airport runway approach area.20 9
County officials cited the plaintiff in Rogers for violating state
statutes related to construction of the sign at his Dairy Queen
Restaurant in Venango County.210 The trial court found the
plaintiff guilty of violating state statutes requiring permission to
construct obstructions within an airport approach area. 21 1 The
plaintiff appealed on the basis that the absence of an air ease-
ment or zoning rule regulating the height of signs made en-
forcement of the Aviation Code provisions an unconstitutional
taking of his property.2 12
The appeal reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which
found the plaintiff had violated FAA guidelines and Penn-
sylvania law, and that PDOT had authority to enforce compli-
ance with FAA regulations designed to identify potential hazards




207 Id. at 121 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 802(2) (1977)).
208 634 A.2d 245 (Pa. 1993).
20 Id. at 246.
210 Id. at 247.
211 Id. (citing 74 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5701 requiring approval from the Penn-
sylvania Department of Transportation before constructing an obstruction in an
airport approach area).
212 Id. at 247.
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to air navigation.213 The court declared that "the legislature em-
powered PDOT to enforce mandatory compliance with FAA reg-
ulations which are designed to identify potential hazards to air
navigation... [u] nlike the determination of the FAA, [PDOT's]
determination is enforceable, rather than advisory."1 4  The
court further determined that the statute and its enforcement
were legitimate exercises of police power,215 and found no tak-
ing of the plaintiffs property by virtue of his prosecution by
state statute.2 1
6
In Persyn v. United States,21 7 the plaintiffs, a group of landown-
ers adjacent to Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas, filed
a $16 million suit against the United States and the City of San
Antonio. They claimed increased noise from the Air Force's ex-
panded use of the base and the city's passage of supplementary
overlay zoning districts for noise protection constituted a taking
under the Fifth Amendment. 218 The landowners' claim asserted
that the City of San Antonio acted for the sole benefit of the
United States by passing a series of ordinances restricting prop-
erty adjacent to the base.2 1 9 The district court dismissed the
landowners action against the city for failure to state a claim for
a constitutional taking.220
On appeal to the United States Claims Court in 1994, the
United States moved for summary judgment on the takings
claim arguing the landowners were time barred, and that the
applicable land use and zoning ordinances were enforceable.221
The court ruled that the regulations at issue did not prohibit the
213 The Federal Aviation Act, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1501 (1988), requires that
any person who proposes to construct or make alterations to a structure in close
proximity to an airport must give notice of the proposed construction to the FAA.
See 14 C.F.R. § 77.13 (1995). The FAA then determines whether or not the pro-
posed construction constitutes a hazard to air navigation. But the determination
by the FAA has no legal effect. "The FAA is not empowered to prohibit or limit
proposed construction it deems dangerous to air navigation." Aircraft Owners
and Pilots Ass'n v. FAA, 600 F.2d 965, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Air Line Pilots
Ass'n Int'l v. FAA, 446 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1971). The court in Rogers reaffirmed
that it is the state's role to enforce regulatory standards. 634 A.2d at 250.
214 Rogers, 634 A.2d. at 253.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 935 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1991).
218 Id. at 72.
219 Id. at 74.
220 Id.
221 Persyn v. United States, 32 Cl. Ct. 579, 582 (1995).
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plaintiffs from use of their property and the regulatory takings
claim was dismissed. 222
In a recent decision of the Iowa Supreme Court, City of Iowa
City v. Hagen2 2 3 the court determined that Iowa City "clearly had
a rational basis for adopting and enforcing an airport zoning
district. '224 The court reversed a lower court ruling that the
city's actions in adopting and enforcing the overlay regulations
deprived the plaintiff of substantive due process and were arbi-
trary and capricious.2 The court's reasoning for the reversal
was based on the city's adoption, almost verbatim, of the federal
standards for airport runways. 22 6
VI. CONCLUSION
To a great extent, it is too late to protect land around major
United States airports from development and use that is either
inconsistent or incompatible with airport operations. But with
the pressures on airports to expand, and a number of expansion
projects underway, the need to regulate for noise and use com-
patibility is well established and pressing. Keeping land around
airports free from development that is inconsistent with their
use insures airports long term safety and expansion potential.
One of the keys to a successful program of land use controls is
legally sustainable zoning regulations that address the needs of
the airport. The legality of zoning depends in large part on the
adopted regulations being grounded on rational and well
thought out comprehensive planning. This is particularly im-
portant today due to the increased judicial and legislative aware-
ness in the protection of private property rights. Ironically, the
answer to designing effective regulations that survive taking
claims may be simply the return to the basic and well thought
out approach of the ALI Model Land Development Code.
Innovative solutions to implementing comprehensive plan-
ning efforts to protect land around airports will also be required
to avoid regulatory taking claims. Overlay zoning ordinances
222 Id. at 585. The plaintiffs in Persyn had also brought a taking challenge
based on a physical invasion of their airspace, similar to the theory forwarded in
Causby, discussed supra note 77. The court did not dismiss that portion of the
takings claim. Persyn, 32 Cl. Ct. at 582. Disposition of the physical invasion claim
is pending.
223 545 N.W.2d 530 (Iowa 1996).
224 Id. at 536.
225 Id. at 535.
226 Id. at 536 (citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 77.21, 77.23, 77.25 (1995)).
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are a useful and legal tool for implementation. The key to their
effectiveness includes a combination of factors: (1) the statutory
authority to adopt them; (2) their basis on comprehensive plan-
ning; (3) the "reasonableness" of the regulations themselves;
and (4) their adoption by overlaying existing zoning ordinances.
Overlay zoning is the least expensive and most acceptable alter-
native for limiting the land areas next to airports to compatible
development.

